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SUMMARY
In the climate change issue, the environmental irreversibility (risk of an acceleration
of mitigation policies if the worse happen) has to be balanced with the investment
irreversibility (risk of over-cautious policies). To explore this balance, we define an
option value for a precautionary climate policy. Using the simplest decision-making
model, we expose how option value relates to the expected value of future information.
Using quantitative data from an integrated assessment model, we find that most of the
times the environmental irreversibility dominates the investment irreversibility. For all
cases explored here, the order of magnitude of the option value was significant, about
50% of the opportunity cost.
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1 Introduction: The twofold irreversibility issue
The United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change objective suggests to
consider a “safety ceiling” for greenhouse gases concentration over which irreversible
damage would occur. From a practical point of view, the accumulation of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere can indeed be regarded as irreversible: at the human generation
timescale concentrations levels can only increase. The problem is that no safe ceiling is
specified, as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recognises. Yet,
doing nothing means giving up the option of reaching the lowest stabilisation levels.
For example, stabilisation of
 
concentration at 400 ppmv has already become
an unrealistic goal. It will be the same for 450 ppmv in a couple of decades if present
trends continue. The range in the estimates of climate sensitivity1, used in (I 1997) is
+1.5C to +4.5C. The combination of environmental irreversibility with unexpected bad
news from climate science could lead to the need of a sudden acceleration of adaptation
and mitigation policies. We would then consider the dilemma of choosing between
economically disruptive policy measures, or face unfavourable climatic changes.
The interplay between irreversibility and uncertainty has been a central issue in en-
vironmental economics, since Henry (1974) and Arrow & Fisher (1974) demonstrated
the existence of an ‘Irreversibility Effect’ in 1974. Historically, this has been illustrated
by analysing the economics of a hydroelectric dam construction project that would
flood a beautiful natural valley. Such a project is irreversible for two reasons: one is
the destruction of the valleys ecosystems, the second has to do with the irrecoverability
of the investment in the building itself.
These two reasons converge to imply that before starting the project, waiting to
have more information is valuable. Historically, the irreversibility effect states that:
Independently of risk aversion, the standard cost-benefit analysis, which
omits this value of information, is biased against environmental preserva-
tion.
But in the climate change issue environmental preservation (that is, early   emission
control efforts) needs investment, whereas environmental exploitation corresponds to
business as usual. Consequently, the two irreversibilities outlined above do not con-
verge but have opposite effects, as stated by IPCC(Bruce, Lee & Haites 1996, SPM,
par.2):
Uncertainties remain which are relevant to judgement of what constitutes
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system and what
needs to be done to prevent such interference. [. . . ] The challenge is not
to find the best policy today for the next 100 years, but to select a prudent
strategy and to adjust it over time in the light of new information.
Earlier mitigation action may increase flexibility in moving toward stabil-
isation of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. The choice of
abatement paths involves balancing the economic risks of rapid abatement
1The long term (equilibrium) change in global mean surface temperature following a doubling of atmo-
spheric equivalent 	 concentration, noted 

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now (that premature capital stock retirement will later be proven unneces-
sary), against the corresponding risks of delay (that more rapid reduction
will then be required, necessitating premature retirement of future capital).
The investment irreversibility effect (Dixit & Pindyck 1994, esp. pp. 412–418)
sets a brake to climate change mitigation policies. It implies that waiting to have more
information is valuable, to avoid the risk of overprotecting the environment. The goal
of this paper is to examine analytically and empirically the balance between environ-
mental and investment irreversibility.
In the sequel of this introduction, I will examine how the literature has developed
the initial intuition into different theoretical and applied directions. Theoretical devel-
opments surveyed by Graham-Tomasi (1995) lead to a more general definition of the
irreversibility effect, that:
Better information leads to more flexible choices.
Explaining how “more flexibility” and “better information” have been represented
helps to understand how this general definition extends the first one stated above, and
to set the relative position of this paper.
Perfect irreversibility can rather clearly be seen as a limit case of very low flexibil-
ity. Mathematically, the former is often represented with inequality constraints. The
latter can be represented in many more different ways such as: (a) ordering on the size
of reachable sets, (b) accumulation and decay dynamics of a natural resource stock (c)
adjustment costs. This paper will not use perfect irreversibility, but rather flexibility
aspects (b) and (c).
There are many ways to define and represent what a better information is. One
approach uses Bayesian considerations and orderings between information structures.
I will remain here at a simpler level by assuming that all uncertainties are resolved
at once at a date  , and that better information means an earlier  . This framework
allows to identify three trends in the litterature to date :
 The sensitivity of results to an earlier resolution of uncertainties has been as-
sessed in most stochastic models on the economics of climate change by com-
paring, for example, results with  to results with ﬀﬁ .
 A second point of view focuses on the expected value of perfect information
(EVPI). This amounts to compute the difference between the expected total cost
assuming ﬂ (a case named the Act Then Learn hypothesis) with the total
cost assuming ﬂﬃ "!#$ (a case named Learn Then Act).
Developing this approach, Manne & Richels (1992, p. 73) were pioneers in intro-
ducing sequential decision making in climate change models. Using GLOBAL
2100, they computed the optimal hedging strategy given a stochastic
 
emis-
sions reduction target. Yet, the methodology they used does not separate the pure
effect of hedging from changes in expected target.
They assumed that the target could take one of three values: %'&)( from the
1990 emission level with probability 16%; %')( (probability 24%) and no re-
striction with probability 60%. Using this value, it would have been interesting
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to compare the optimal hedging strategy with the optimal policy assuming the
average constraint, that is %*+-, .)( reduction target known from the start.
 That idea is precisely what the option value approach is about: comparing the
case / with the case 0132405160ﬃ7$ 2. The former case, / , does
correspond to the Act Then Learn hypothesis. The latter could be named the
Never Learn hypothesis, after Peck & Teisberg (1993). Here I will use a different
vocabulary, and refer to  as the sequential decision framework, and the
other the one shot decision framework.
Theoretical research has shown the existence of wide classes of decision problems
for which we knew a priori that the irreversibility effect holds. Earlier  leads to
more flexible near term choices. Building upon this intuition, applied literature takes
a logically different stance. The irreversibility effect can be used as a principle to
interpret a model’s results. It allows to explain intuitively what happens to the optimal
near term choice when  is earlier.
Let us consider a model of the economics of climate change computing the optimal
near term
  
emissions reduction 8 under uncertainty. The sensitivity of 8 to  may
be interpreted as the results of the trade off between the two irreversibility effects. If,
for example, a model finds that the perspective of a better future information leads to
a stricter control of
 

emissions in the next decades, then for that model it may
be asserted that the environmental irreversibility effect is stronger than the investment
irreversibility effect.
The IPCC statement that “the uncertainty-based cost-benefit assessments completed
thus far find higher optimal rates of abatement than do the deterministic cost-benefit
models”(Bruce et al. 1996, ch. 10 sum., p. 372), seems to put forward the environ-
mental irreversibility effect. Yet it depends essentially on an inter-model comparison,
and as such does not allow to conclude decisively. A closer look at the irreversibility
effect in the climate change issue literature shows indeed that published results cover
the whole possibilities:
 Nordhaus (1994) finds that introducing uncertainty in DICE increases optimal
control rates by about 50%. This supports the idea that the environmental irre-
versibility effect matters.
 On the contrary, Kolstad (1994), using a stochastic version of the DICE model,
suggests rather that
The irreversibility of investment capital has a stronger effect than ir-
reversibilites in climate change (other than catastrophic effects).
These results are confirmed by Ulph & Ulph (1997), who find that
2When 9:<;>=?:@;:<ACB , learning never occurs, so the payoffs take their expected value. This idea is
close to but different from the notion of certainty equivalent, the case defined by “ D9D:<;>=?:@;:<ACB and all
parameters take their expected value”. Both can be used as surrogates for the stochastic E9GFIHIFIH case
(Simon 1956).
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For most parameters values, current abatement of emissions of green-
house gases should be lower when we allow for the possibility of
obtaining better information.
 In between, Peck & Teisberg (1993, fig. 9 and 10), found that regarding   
emission in the short run, 20 or 40 years,
optimal policies are roughly the same regardless of how uncertainties
are resolved.
In sum, it appears that empirical results to date are far from unanimously justifying
the political concern over the risks of environmental irreversibility, the precautionary
principle. Beyond methodological issues with integrated assessment, which should
not be neglected, different reasons could explain this discrepancy. We cannot exclude
a priori that the two irreversibility risks are large but balanced, so that the net effect
may be actually small. Another point we have to consider here is that the irreversibility
effect is not the only component of option value supporting the precautionary principle.
 For the sake of clarity, risk aversion, which leads to the more general questions
of intergenerational and interregional decision making, was deliberately not in-
cluded in the model defined below. This is the reason why the option value in
this model is only a quasi-option value when viewed from a more general point
of view.
 An important component of quasi-option value not studied in this paper has been
named dependant learning by Fisher & Hanemann (1987):
It surely require no algebra to show that, if the information about the
consequences of an irreversible development action can be obtained
only by undertaking development, this strengthen the case for some
development.
Less
 

emissions would slow the rise of the climate change signal over the
climate natural variability noise. But this effect, which supports pollution, may
actually be small given that even under the most extreme reduction proposals to
date, the concentration reduction is only 12 ppmv in 2020, a small figure com-
pared to the difference between the 400ppmv expected at that date and the prein-
dustrial
 
concentration of about 280 ppmv. On the other hand, emission
control policies are likely to bring significant scientific, technical and institu-
tional learning. Thus, it appears that the effects of dependant learning are also
ambiguous in the case of climate change.
Here, I focus on the irreversibility effect and option value theory applied to
 
emis-
sions policies. In the next section, I wish to frame the discussion theoretically by
highlighting the notion of the expected value of future information. Then, I will exam-
ine empirically under which hypothesis one irreversibility dominates the other, and if
the net irreversibility effect is significant.
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The approach to analysing the climate change issue followed in the paper is in-
tertemporal optimisation: seeking an emission strategy J which minimizes the to-
tal cost. Within this methodology, the model presented here uses stochastic discrete
choices decision framework. This may be original. To date, discrete choices analy-
sis between predefined pathways has been led in (Wigley, Richels & Edmonds 1996)
without uncertainty; while in the other hand most integrated assessment models with
uncertainty used continuous choices, taking feasible J to be any arbitrary non negative
function of time (Nordhaus 1994), (Manne & Richels 1992).
2 Analysing climate policy choices with the expected
value of future information
Figure 1 illustrates the two stages, binary choices decision problem considered here. In
a very stylised way, the issue boils down to a near term choice and a long term choice,
each being between two alternatives only. Thus, the climate policy issue is represented
by a choice J between four alternatives.
 The near term choice, 8 , corresponds to the effort of
 
emission abatement in
the next two decades. It models the discussion about the timing of
 

emission
abatement (IPCC 1995) known as the WGI vs. WRE3controversy. An aggres-
sive reduction policy is represented by 8K/LNM*O , whereas a policy that lead to
emissions remaining close to business-as-usual for two decades are represented
by 8PLNQSR .
 The long term choice, made in 2020 in the emissions profiles used here, regards
the level of the ceiling of atmospheric
 

concentration. Stabilising at 450
ppmv would ask more efforts than at 550, but would lead to lower climate change
impacts4.
 Overall, these climate impacts depend upon a stochastic variable T# , which can be
either high or low5. The probability U of high damages #)V , and the probability
W%XU of low damages #ZY , are assumed known from the start and independant of
8 .
I note \[^]_T#Z`_Jba the total cost, that is the sum of the reduction cost and the climate
damage, to be minimised. As explained in the introduction, I adopt the option value
approach, and thus consider two decision frameworks, denoted with the letter 0 :
 In the 0c?1d"e?fﬀ?ﬃ decision case, it is assumed that policymakers act as if they
did not expect to receive new factual elements to revise their decisions. Here,
3WGI stands for ‘IPCC Working Group I’, and WRE stands for Wigley et al. (1996).
4The problem is similar to a natural resource management issue by considering that the quality of the
atmosphere, measured by how far the 	 concentration is away from 550 ppmv, is an unique environmental
good. Choosing 450 is similar to preserving the resource. Choosing WRE in first period is irreversible as it
decreases the quantity of resource available in second period.
5I will note gh 9ji h+kmlonqp>r is h"t the expected uh , and v"= n uh sﬀ9^i= n<h+k s lonwp>r isq= n@h"t s the expected
value of any function = n uh s
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Figure 1: Four different
 
scenarios for next century
These four time profiles are defined here to represent the WGI vs. WRE controversy. They
were computed by minimising the total emission reduction cost, as specified Box 2, under the
following constraints:
WRE550 respects the concentration ceiling xzy|{P}ﬁ}ﬁ~
WGI450 respects the concentration ceiling xy{"}~
WRE450 respects the ceiling x y {"}ﬁ~ and coincide with WRE550 for {~?ﬁ~
WGI550 respects the ceiling x y {}+}~ and coincide with WGI450 for 	{ﬁ~+ﬁ~
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short term decisions are not influenced by the fact that, in the long run, choices
will adapt as we learn more about the climate and socio-economic system. Thus,
analysing the expected costs and benefits is enough.
 In the 0We+d??Łbdﬁ16ﬃ707#) decisions case, it is assumed that policymakers defer the
long term decision until technical and scientific knowledge is available (here in
 ).
The difference between these two decision frameworks can be illustrated considering
that there is today a non zero probability for a dramatic surprise implying that climate
damages are more extreme than expected. The first case assumes that such probability
will not be revised between now and  . Conversely, the second assumes that new
information will allow to be more conclusive about extreme damages before  .
Because it considers only an average case, the one shot decision framework is
analytically easier to handle than the sequential framework. Yet, policymakers have
learned a lot from climate sciences over the last 20 years, and probably can expect to
learn much more before 2020. Thus sequential decision, although more technical to
formalise as it relies on stochastic dynamic programming, is maybe a more accurate
description of reality.
Figure 2 shows how these two decision problems can be solved using backward
induction. The results appearing row c are the R*JU4d+ﬃ d+!)[Seﬁﬃ ]w8|a . Before elaborating
with these somewhat complicated expressions, let us review some basic elements of
the option value theory.
The four R*JU4d+ﬃ d+!)[Seﬁﬃ ]w8|a fits into two middle rows, two middle columns of
Table 1. Notice that they are laid out exactly as in Figure 2 row c, with 0	e+d??Ł4d+16ﬃ707#)
to the left, 0	?1d"e?fﬀ?ﬃ to the right, 8LNQR top and 8PLNM*O bottom. This table
allows a convenient definition of the key notions of opportunity costs, expected value
of future information, and option value.
For a given decision framework 0 , the rational near-term decision is to choose the 8
which lead to the lower R*JU4d+ﬃ d+!)[Seﬁﬃ  . This comparison can be done by examining
the sign of the opportunity costs, defined by reading the table vertically, for each the
information case 0 . As set in Equation 1, the opportunity cost of the WGI strategy
is the difference between its expected total costs and the cost of the alternative LNQSR
strategy. That opportunity cost is positive when and only when LNQSR is a better choice
than LNM*O .

UUZ??ﬃ7Ł41605ﬃ7$-[Seﬁﬃ

]5LNM*OaR*JUZd?Iﬃ d?!)[Seﬃ

]wLNM*O)a%PR*JU4d?Iﬃ d?![Seﬁﬃ

]wLNQSRa
(1)
Equation 2 defines the expected value of future information (EVFI), as the differ-
ence expected cost one shot minus expected cost sequential. This appears Table 1 hori-
zontally. It is intuitive that EVFI is always positive6. To stress that EVFI is conditional
6Mathematically, this can be demonstrated by using the results on Figure 2 and the fact that for any
n)5

5ﬁq
s we have:
n)Iw
s
l

n+q
s6 

n)blj+q

l^
s
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The sequential decision framework The one shot decision framework
a
WRE
WGI
a-
a+
a-
a+
550
450
550
450
550
450
550
450
TC[a+, WRE550]
TC[a+, WRE450]
TC[a- , WRE550]
TC[a- , WRE450]
TC[a+, WGI550]
TC[a+, WGI450]
TC[a- , WGI550]
TC[a- , WGI450]
WRE
WGI
450
550
450
550
a+
a-
a+
a-
a+
a-
a+
a-
TC[a+, WRE550]
TC[a- , WRE550]
TC[a+, WRE450]
TC[a- , WRE450]
TC[a+, WGI550]
TC[a- , WGI550]
TC[a+, WGI450]
TC[a- , WGI450]
b
WRE
WGI
a-
a+
a-
a+
min{TC[a+, WRE550] ,
TC[a+, WRE450] }
min{TC[a- , WRE550] ,
TC[a- , WRE450] }
min{TC[a+, WGI550] ,
TC[a+, WGI450] }
min{TC[a- , WGI550],
TC[a- , WGI450] }
WRE
WGI
450
550
450
550
p TC[a+, WRE550] +
[1- p] TC[a- , WRE550]
p TC[a+, WRE450] +
[1- p] TC[a- , WRE450]
p TC[a+, WGI550] +
[1- p] TC[a- , WGI550]
p TC[a+, WGI450] +
[1- p] TC[a- , WGI450]
c
WRE
WGI
Expected CostSequential [WRE]=
p min{TC[a+, WRE550],
TC[a+, WRE450] }+
[1- p] min{TC[a- , WRE550],
TC[a- , WRE450] }
Expected CostSequential [WGI]=
p min{TC[a+, WGI550],
TC[a+, WGI450] }+
[1- p] min{TC[a- , WGI550],
TC[a- , WGI450] }
WRE
WGI
Expected CostOneShot [WRE]=
min {p TC[a+, WRE550] +
[1- p] TC[a- , WRE550]} ,
p TC[a+, WRE450] +
[1- p] TC[a- , WRE450]}
Expected CostOneShot [WGI]=
min {p TC[a+, WGI550] +
[1- p] TC[a- , WGI550]} ,
p TC[a+, WGI450] +
[1- p] TC[a- , WGI450]}
Figure 2: WRE vs. WGI decision analysis
Columns read from top to bottom. The optimal strategy that minimises expected total cost is
computed using the algorithm of averaging-out-and-folding-back. The little black squares rep-
resent nodes of the decision tree under the control of the decision maker, and little black discs
represent stochastic nodes. More on dynamic programming can be found in (Bruce et al. 1996,
par. 2.3.1, p. 62).
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Sequential One shot difference ¡¢ﬀ£ﬁ¤I¥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Table 1: Option Value and conditional Expected Value of Future Information
This table allows to read the definition of (quasi-)option value (lower right) in two ways, either
as the difference in Opportunity Costs or as a difference in expected value of future information.
Since it represents costs (utility losses) and not values (utility gains), we consider the difference
one shot minus sequential, contrary to (Fisher & Hanemann 1987).
to what near term choice 8 we consider ( LNM*O or LNQSR ), I will note it ÉËÊÌÍ]w8|a .
ÉËÊÌÍ]w8|aÉËÎ)Ï4ÐﬁÑÒÐ+Ó
 ÔÕ
ÒÖ×Ø7Ù¬ÚﬁÖ_ÛI]q8a	%PÉ	Î>Ï4ÐﬁÑÒÐﬁÓ
 ÔÕ
ÒÙ¬Ø7ÜIÝﬁØ7×ÛqÞ ßàq]w8|a (2)
Equation 3 is a classical definition of option value. It corresponds to the bot-
tom right cell in Table 1 , as the difference of the two cells to its left. By defi-
nition,
*á
]5LNM*Oa is positive whenever

UUZ??ﬃ7Ł4160ﬃ7$>[Seﬁﬃ_âãä å æ?â_ç]wLNM*O)a is greater
than

UU4??ﬃ7ŁZ160ﬃ7$-[Seﬁﬃ_å ä è é"ä7ãç¬<êë]wLNM*O)a . In this situation, conventional cost-benefit
analysis (set in a one shot framework) overestimate LNM*O opportunity cost, when com-
pared to the real-world sequential decision framework.
*á
]5LNM*Oa

UUZ??ﬃ7ŁZ160ﬃ7$-[Seﬁﬃ_â_ãä å æ?â çI]5LNM*Oa%

UUZ??ﬃ7Ł4160ﬃ7$>[Seﬁﬃ_å ä_è é"ä7ã"ç¬@êëI]wLNM*O)a
(3)
Equation 4 is another definition of
*á
, which is equivalent to Equation 3, as one
can see by reading Table 1 row first instead of columns first. Fisher & Hanemann
(1990) stated that equality by saying
the option value is a conditional value of information.
*á
]wLNM*O)aËÉìÊ\Ì|Í]¬íﬂîÍ_a%PÉËÊ\Ì|Í]qíïmÉa (4)
Finally, let us define Equation 5 the relative importance of the option value. Note
that this ratio  is not theoretically limited between zero and one, but can take any
value, positive or negative from zero to infinity. This is related to the fact that the
expected value of future information, and therefore option value, depends only upon to
the future benefit of flexibility, but not upon its near-term cost.
ð
*á
]q8a

UUZ??ﬃ7Ł4160ﬃ7$>[Seﬁﬃ
âãä å æ?â_ç
]q8a
(5)
In this ratio, the sign of the numerator shows which of the two irreversibility effects is
larger. The sign of the denominator shows which choice would appear optimal in a tra-
ditional (one shot) cost benefit analysis framework. Whenever jñò , the irreversibility
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effects tends to support the result of the one shot analysis. When ó , there is no
option value. For  in ôC-`ﬁõ , the option value decreases the advantage of the one shot
analysis optimal choice it. At jö , the sequential decision maker would be indiffer-
ent between the two alternatives WRE and WGI. Its only when  lies above one, that
the two decision frameworks would lead to choosing a different near term alternative.
Although to date, option value has played a central role in the literature, I may
conjecture that ÉìÊ\Ì|Í]q8a will turn out to be a more operational concept than *á ]w8|a
for the following five theoretical and practical reasons.
1. The EVFI approach allows to give a quick proof of the irreversibility effect,
based upon the positiveness of EVFI7.
2. Empirically, Fisher & Hanemann (1990) proposed some ways to estimate ÉìÊ\Ì|Í]q8a .
This contrasts with the conceptual difficulties with estimating OV using Equation
3, paradoxical in the way that, as Favereau (1991) notes,
If the agent can compute it, then he does not need it. If he needs it, he
can not compute it.
3. The words value of future information may be more self explaining than option
value, and having a clear vocabulary could help economists to deliver a clear
message to policy makers. This is all the more important that the distinction
between option values and quasi-option values is rather subtle (Bruce et al. 1996,
par. 5.5.2).
4. A central hypothesis to prove the positiveness of
*á
]q8a is that the resolution
of uncertainties is independent of whatever choice has been made in first period.
The option value concept tends to obscure that hypothesis, and hides the fact
that it is the perspective of learning new information that is critical with regard
to irreversibility, not uncertainties in themselves. If we did not expect to be better
informed tomorrow8, there would be no advantage to invest in flexibility today.
The EVFI is explicit on all this: a choice a giving more information will lead to
a higher ÉËÊ\Ì|Í]w8|a .
5. The option value is a difference, and as such it is only defined as long as a choice
8 is compared to another irreversible choice ÷ . On the contrary, ÉËÊÌÍ]w8|a is
intrinsic, it depends only of the choice a being examined. This implies that
ÉìÊ\Ì|Í]q8a can be used to compare symmetrically any number of alternatives,
7By proving the irreversibility effect, we mean to show that if an alternative ø is irreversible, then the
option value of the opposite alternative is positive.
Let us assume that, for example, the WRE450 path is infinitely costly. In the framework described here,
if ùúû is followed now, there will be no other alternative in 2020 than to aim at 550 ppmv. This can be
interpreted as resource exploitation in first period (i.e. ùúû ) is an irreversible choice (i.e. 450 is no more
reachable). In this case, no decision will be needed in 2020, and therefore future information has no value:
EVFI( ùúû ) is zero.
Mathematically, if |ü n<h ùýú3û	þßIHs is large enough, then   n
	  6sì9 H because for both : we
have:
û

i7A_A
¹
n
ùýú3ûìsZ9ji?|ü
n<h+k|
ùýú3ûìßIßIHs
lnwpr
isC|ü
n<ht3
ùúûËßIßIHs
In this situation,  n ùﬀﬁs = EVFI n ùﬂﬁs , and since we know that the EVFI is always positive, so is
option value.
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with no need to give a special attention to the irreversible one (if it exists).
This workaround the arbitrary pick up of a baseline reference scenario, which
is recognised to be one of the biggest methodological difficulty for a long term
issue such as climate change.
Let us now analyse the EVFI by making more explicit the costs and the benefits
associated with climate change policies. Results of Figure 2 row c with Equation 2
imply:
ÉËÊÌ|Í]q8aìﬃ! #"
$&%('
 
] T
)
`8|&&a`
%('
 
]_T
)
`8+*&a-,%
%
ﬃ! ."
$/'
 
] T
)
`8&&aI`
'
 
] T
)
`80*)&a,
(6)
Now assume explicitly that, for a given emission trajectory J , the total cost is the sum
of deterministic reduction costs and stochastic climate change impacts:
\[^]T#ﬀ`J4aìQd?!Ł4ﬃ70?13[Seﬁﬃ]qJ4a01DO2jUZ#)Iﬃ]T#4`_J4a (7)
The critical variables for the discussion are the future opportunity costs (the cost dif-
ference between the 450 ppmv and the 550 ppmv scenario) and benefits (the additional
avoided climate damage). These future opportunity costs [^]q8a are conditional to the
near term policy 8 . Formally, they are defined as:
[^]q8aì43
ä5
Qd?!Ł4ﬃ70?13[Seﬁﬃ]w80*)&a%PQSd+!ŁbIﬃ707?13[Seﬃ]w8|&&a (8)
Assume that the future opportunity benefits T6 depends not significantly upon the near
term policy 8 . This approximation is made to clarify the exposition, but is not essential
and was not used in numeric results shown at the end of this paper (Figure 5).
T
6
43
ä-5
O2jUZ#)Iﬃ]T#ﬀ`8|&&a|%O72oU4#)Iﬃ]_T#4`8+*&a (9)
A few calculations omitted here allow to rewrite Equation 6 in a more compact form:
ÉËÊ\Ì|Í]w8|aì8ﬃ! ."
$&%
T
9
`
 
]w8|a,%
%
ﬃ: #"
$
T
9
`
 
]q8a-, (10)
This expression can be regarded as a function of [^]q8a , as plotted Figure 3. It
appears that ÉËÊÌ|Í]q8a:;  whenever [^]q8a is within ô
6
Y`
6
Võ , otherwise it is zero.
The economic interpretation of that is the following: Future benefits T6 of reaching the
lower ceiling 450 ppmv is stochastic. Ex ante, before knowing the realised value 6 Y
or
6
V , comparing costs and benefits leads to three cases:
 If [^]w8|a is lower than
6
Y , then we can already decide that after 8 , it will be
interesting to aim at 450 ppmv.
 If [^]q8a is greater than
6
V , then we can already decide that after 8 , only 550
ppmv will be interesting.
8In the political agenda chaotic progress, climate change issue may suddenly receive a high priority
even without significant new scientific findings. Learning about public and private preferences, and about
technical change may be as decisive as learning about the ocean-atmosphere dynamics. Indeed, Me´gie (1992)
recalls that the most important policy measures against the hole in the ozone layer have been adopted at the
time of greatest scientific uncertainties.
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Figure 3: Value of information
Figure shows the expected value of information <>=@?BA
ÇDC
È
as a function of the cost ³
ÇDC
È
com-
pared to the stochastic benefits EF . It is assumed here that uncertainty is multiplicative, that is
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«7M
Ç
¯
È
. The EVFI is maximum when the cost exactly equals the expected
benefit:
³
ÇDC
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KRQ
ÇTS
¦
Q>È U (11)
 Otherwise, [^]w8|a is within the uncertainty range, and after 8 we will have to learn
more about benefits of climate change mitigation T
6
before choosing a ceiling.
In the first two cases, the information on the level of climate damages is useless since
we know already enough to define the optimal long term decision. It is only in the
third situation that 8 is only the first step of a sequential decision strategy and that
information has a value.
3 Comparing environmental and investment irreversibil-
ities
As stated Equation 4, the option value here can be seen as the difference EVFI( LNM*O )
minus EVFI( LNQSR ). Consequently, Figure 3 allows to represent graphically how the
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A B C
WVLNQR
[YX
6
Y
6
YZXﬂ[YX
6
V
6
V[Xﬂ[
6
V
Xﬂ[ Only 550 1
\V

LNM*O
6
YZXﬂ[YX
6
V Controversial
Environmental
Irreversibility 2
[]X
6
Y Only 450 InvestmentIrreversibility Two consistent views 3
Table 2: Qualitative analysis framework
This table is represent the possible outcomes of an a priori cost benefit analysis of the two-
stages decision problem with uncertainty represented Figure 1. The assumption that ³ Ç ¿EÂ ® È
is greater than ³
Ç
¿GÀWÁÈ
excludes A1, A2 and B1. In C2, for example, it can be said that ¿GÀWÁ
is more flexible, since ¿òÂ ® is irreversible, and thus ¿GÀWÁ option value is positive.
sign of the option value is determined. The situation described Figure 3 can be charac-
terised by three key aspects:
1. From 2020 onwards, it will be less costly to achieve stabilisation at 450 ppmv if
aggressive policies have been started early. It implies that the point correspond-
ing to LNQR is located to the right of the point corresponding to LNM*O or that
[^]5LNQSRa@;ﬂ[^]wLNM*O)a .
2. The expected damage ^6 lies near the left of the interval, close to the low hy-
pothesis damage 6 Y . This assessment of the subjective probability U is based
upon the a real concern amongst climate scientist for the possibility of climate
surprises, events of high consequences with low probability.
3. The decision making problem is always sequential, that is both [^]wLNQSRa and
[^]5LNM*Oa are within ] 6 Y , 6 V [ , so that for both near term alternatives the EVPI
is non zero.
The last two points combined implies that [^]wLNQSRa and [^]5LNM*Oa are likely to lie
between ^6 and 6 V . Combined with the first, they lead to the situation Figure 3, with
EVPI(WGI) above EVPI(WRE). To the extend that these three points are typical, the
option value of LNM*O is typically positive.
Discussing the third point leads to examine the different positions of [^]wLNQSRa
and [^]wLNM*O)a with respect to 6 Y and 6 V . Given (1.) this leads to the six situations
described Table 2. This table corresponds to Figure 4, which represents
*á
]5LNM*Oa in
the plane ]w[^]wLNQSRa`[^]5LNM*Oaa .
In Figure 4, one notice at first sight the four flat square areas in the corners. These
correspond to corner cells A1, C1, A3 and C3 in Table 2, and describe situations where
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Figure 4: Difference of EVFI.
This figure shows the
Ã`_
Ç
¿GÀWÁÈ
, the option value of aggressive near term acb  emission re-
ductions, in the plane Ç ³ Ç ¿GÀWÁÈ I7³ Ç ¿òÂ ® È7È , see Figure 3. The nine areas corresponds to
Table 2’s nine cells. By definition, ³ ÇDC È is the opportunity cost of reaching the 450 ppmv acb 
concentration ceiling if we follow the
C
type of trajectory between now and 2020. Future oppor-
tunity benefits of reaching the 450 ppmv ceiling are: F t K
S
and F k K  , with a probability
°
K
~d e .
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uncertainty does not matter at all, so the option value is zero. Even if climate damage
T
6
is stochastic, we know already enough to decide.
Cell C3 corresponds to
6
VfX[^]wLNQSRa and [^]wLNM*O)agX
6
Y . The first inequal-
ity means that if we choose today to delay
 
reductions policies, we know we will
choose in 2020 the 550 ppmv concentration target, whatever we learn about the cli-
mate damage. The second inequality, about WGI, means that if we choose aggressive
near term reductions, then we will choose the low concentration ceiling in 2020. This
describes a situation of mutually exclusive irreversibilities.
The environmental irreversibility effect situation corresponds to cell C2 in Table
2 and to the front hill in Figure 4. This is the situation described in footnote before,
where we assumed that LNQSR could only lead to the 550 ppmv, and therefore was
economically irreversible. In this situation, we see that the option value of LNM*O is
positive. Cell B3 corresponds in the same way to the investment irreversibility effect. In
the central area of Figure 4, corresponding to cell B2, the sign of the option value is not
uniform. It describes the situation in which we may have to revise choices according to
the new information in the future. In that situation, both environmental and investment
irreversibilities have to be considered. I called this area decision under controversy
situation in reference to (Hourcade, Salles & The´ry 1992).
To explore further the issue, I used an explicit model of
 
emissions abatement
costs and climate damages, DIAM, in order to get a dollar value for
*á
]wLNM*O)a . I
specify Equation 7 using functional forms summarised Figure 5. The most important
economic parameters here are the discount rate  (4% per yr), the magnitude of climate
damages at double
 

equivalent !
h (1.75% of Gross World Product) and an inertia
parameter i (50 years).
That last parameter demands more explanation. Dimensional analysis of Equation
12 shows that i is a duration. It can be interpreted as the characteristic time of the
socio economic system producing emission reductions, a critical parameter when con-
sidering the irreversibility of a system evolution. Following the EMF14 guidelines set
by expert survey by Nordhaus (1995), I consider that in the high case, occurring with a
probability UzN+ %, climate damages are 7.8 times higher than in the low case.
Table 3 shows the different parameters set examined and corresponding results.
Given the wide range of parameters explored here, it is not surprising to find a wide
range for option values. Let us begin by explaining the central case A.
 The opportunity cost of LNM*O appears to be positive in both the one shot and
the sequential framework. This means that the LNQR appears less costly than
LNM*O .
 It appears that the cost is smaller in a sequential framework: the option value
*á
]wLNM*O)a is positive but not large enough to reverse the decision in a binary
choice situation.
 Quantitatively, the opportunity cost of LNM*O , evaluated at 0.5% of 1990 GWP
in the one shot framework, is divided in two in the sequential decision making
framework. This means that the option value is about 0.25% of 1990 GWP.
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Figure 5: DIAM model of explicit reduction cost and climate damages
Following Ha-Duong, Grubb & Hourcade (1997), reduction costs and climate damages are dis-
counted using a social risk-free rate Ä (4%). They are defined for an emission reduction pathway
that abate the fraction ¯ Ç  È of the IS92a reference scenario ®y µPÇ  È , so that actual emission level
at date  is:   µP
Ç

È
ÇTS
¦ ¯
Ç

È7È
.
Reduction costs are determined (Equation 11) by a technical progress rate Ä (1%) and a character-
istic time of energy systems  (50 years). The costs scale ±º Ç  È is normalised ( ±º Ç }ﬁ~ È+K S d eW ,
±º
Ç
ﬁ~
È+K
ed
S& ) so that total cost is comparable to DICEs one (Nordhaus 1994).
Climate damages are determined (Equation 12) by a linear function of lagged concentration
x
y
t(
, using a climatic inertia lag  K e+~ years. Damages are set to be zero in P K
S&\~
, so
x

K
x
sŁP (314 ppmv), and increasing at a rate of ¤ K
S
% per year (to capture the idea that
damages increase with, but not as fast as, global wealth).
The reference calibration level for damages is set at ²  K
S
d

} % of Gross World Product
(GWP), for a doubling of acb  equivalent concentration x  K 

 ppmv.
Equation 13 defines acb  concentration at date  , using a linear perturbation model. Reference
concentration path x
µPÇ

È is computed from IS92a total carbon emissions. Â
Ç
©
È is the at-
mospheric response function, and the 0.471 factor converts emissions in GtC to atmospheric
concentrations in ppmv.
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Parameters Results
#)V U]w#)VËa i !
h
p EVFI Ç
¿GÀWÁÈ
EVFI Ç
¿EÂ
®
È
Ã`_
Ç
¿EÀWÁÈ
Ã
³|½_¸+µ´¾I½_y
Ç
¿EÂ
®
È
Ã
³´µw¶ ·ﬁµ¸ﬁy@¹ÆºI¼
Ç
¿GÀWÁÈ
Ä
A 7.8 0.1 50 1.75 0.04 A 2.89 2.64 0.25 0.51 0.26 50%
B - - 20 - - B 2.82 3.12 -0.30 -0.56 -0.26 54%
C - - 200 - - C 2.94 2.31 0.63 1.24 0.61 21%
D - - - - 0.05 D 0.61 0.14 0.47 2.12 1.66 22%
E - - - - 0.03 E 0.00 9.35 -9.35 -13.3 -3.99 70%
F - - - 2.50 - F 3.07 4.69 -1.63 -2.41 -0.79 67%
G - - - 1.04 - G 1.29 0.70 0.59 1.84 1.24 32%
H 3.9 - - - - H 0.91 0.24 0.67 1.27 0.60 53%
I - 0.5 - - - I 2.79 7.69 -4.89 -10.9 -6.05 45%
J - 0.02 - - - J 0.58 0.53 0.05 1.57 1.52 3%
-: same as case A
Table 3: Sensitivity analysis of WGI option value.
Parameters: discount rate Ä ; overall magnitude of climate damages ²  ; socio economic inertia
 and magnitude of damages in the high hypothesis « k with probability ° (low damages « t K
S
everywhere).
Results: expected values of future information EVFI, the option value
Ã`_
and Ä , and present
opportunity cost
Ã
³ . These are in % of Gross World Product, except Ä which is a relative value
as defined Equation 5.
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This result shows that the option value is in the same order of magnitude as opportunity
costs. If I take ﬀ,+ V
W
as an indicator of 1990 GWP, option value is about 50 billion
dollars. This figure is comparable to expected values of present information (EVPI) in
(Manne & Richels 1992, p. 85), and (Nordhaus & Propp 1997).
The fact that option value is significant compared to opportunity costs is confirmed
by sensitivity tests B to J: Opportunity costs in the sequential and one shot frameworks
do differ significantly across range of parameters studied here, with X  % to 70%
(except for the low uncertainty case Uzﬀ,  ).
The option value for LNM*O is positive only in six cases out of ten. Explaining
this gives the key intuition on the sign of option value. As defined Equation 1, the
opportunity cost of LNM*O is the difference of total expected cost between LNM*O and
LNQSR . Thus its absolute value 

[  ]wLNM*O)a can be regarded as the cost of a non
optimal near-term choice, or the cost of error. Observe then that for all ten scenarios:


[Wå_ä è é"ä7ã"ç¬@êë]5LNM*OaW)ñ

[ â_ãä å æ?â çﬁ]wLNM*O)a
With this in mind, Table 3 shows that the sign of the option value corresponds to the
idea that adaptability tends to decrease the near-term stakes: in sequential decision
making, the cost of errors is always lower than in the one shot framework.
Two other results appear from the table. First, all parameters set explored here but
one describe the decision under controversy situation (cell B2 in Table 2), since the
EVFI is non zero except in the E case. This is not as much a result than a check that
the values of parameters explored here are consistent with the more general view that
sequential decision matters.
Second,  is never above one, which means that quasi option value alone would
not justify a change in the optimal near-term choice. This does not really weaken
our central result on the importance of the option value, as it is obviously a direct
consequence of the binary-choice decision framework used here.
Figure 6 represents Table 3 results. It allows to understand how option value de-
pends upon parameters i ,  , U and !
h
. Points representing Table 3 results are plotted
over a top view of Figure 4 central area. All variations can be explained:
When the characteristic time of socio economic system i increases from 20 to
200 years, the point moves to the right from B to C. This means that higher inertia
i significantly increases the costs of going to 450 ppmv if we start by following the
WRE path, but has little effect if we follow WGI. This is because higher inertia i
makes adjustments of the economic system more costly, a fact represented in Equation
12 by i

]qJ
ç
%ﬂJ
ç
Y
V
a . If we start on a LNQSR type of trajectory, then the costs of
switching later to a strict concentration ceiling as 450 ppmv are mainly adjustment
costs, directly sensitive to the inertia i . On the other hand, if we start of a WGI-like
pathway, the adjustment costs are not so significant, so [^]5LNM*Oa is not so sensitive to
i .
Lower discount rate or higher climate damages have the same effect: both points E
and F are to the bottom left of A. This coincidence could have been expected, given that
damages occur far in the future. The direction in which points move is also intuitive.
Given that we project the results over a background where the damages remains fixed,
an increase in damages is graphically represented as a decrease in reduction costs.
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Figure 6: Empirical exploration of the most flexible choice.
The option value is represented by grey shades and contour lines. Points in clearer areas repre-
sents parameters set which lead to positive option value for early emission control. This figure
corresponds to a top view of Figure 4, magnified over central area. Methodology: In the graphics
background, probability for high damages is ° K ~d
S
. The various ³
ÇDC
È
and F
ÇDC
È have been
computed for each line of Table 3. Then the point (C(WRE), C(WGI)) was projected upon the
background using the piecewise linear function mapping  0, F t , F , F k onto  0, 1, 1.1, 2  .
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The I case (high U ) and J case (low U ) illustrates Equation 11. Note that case C3
was not illustrated. This may be because there is no parameter to represent induced
technical change in the model. Induced technical change has a direct effect on option
value, since it decrease the cost of the long term environmental preservation (550) if
and only if preservation action occur in the first period ( 8ýLNM*O ). Figure 6, it moves
the point to the South. To date, that critical aspect only begins to appear in integrated
assessment models, and it is not unrelated to dependant learning.
4 Conclusions
This paper did not explore the effects of risk aversion and dependant learning. It out-
lined a methodology to compute a quasi-option value for environment preservation in
the climate change issue, by comparing strategies involving aggressive near term
 
emissions abatement with more moderate strategies.
The option value was defined as the variation of the expected value of future in-
formation between these two strategies. This allowed to examine qualitatively (Table
2) as well as numerically (Table 3) the balance between environmental irreversibility
and investment irreversibility; and to evaluate whether the net irreversibility effect is
significant.
The first result is that in the central case and for the majority of the parameters
values explored here, the option value of early abatement is positive, that is the envi-
ronnemental irreversibility effect dominates.
This supports the view that there is a large benefit in purchasing insurance against
climate change by early action to mitigate greenhouse gases emissions.
More generally, numerical experiments found a positive option value for LNM*O
when LNQR was the least cost choice and vice versa. This supports the view that the
effect of future adaptability is to decreases the cost of errors in near-term choices. This
balanced result is not surprising, given that wide uncertainties remain with respect to
the relative reduction, mitigation and climate damage costs and subjective probabilities.
The second result is that quasi-option value is very significant, about 50% of the
cost. That was confirmed by all sensitivity tests carried out. Even if, framing the
decision as a binary choice situation, the optimal near term choice was found to be the
same for sequential or one shot framework, it remains that the opportunity cost of the
alternative action is divided by a factor two in the sequential case.
This quantification of the magnitude of option value may be a relatively new result.
I look forward to extend that analysis, as the discrete choices decision-making frame-
work outlined here is rather general and could be used with other integrated assessment
models. It has been widely said that uncertainties and irreversibilities should have im-
portant effects on policy choices (see for example (Int 1997)). These results confirm
empirically that preserving flexibility is a policy objective to be ranked equally with
the minimisation of reduction costs and the mitigation of climate damages.
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